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I. Introduction
Few living creatures have the capacity to stir Americans like
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dolphin. What might cynically be referred to as the "Flipper factor,"
so named because of a 1960s American television program that
starred a dolphin named Flipper, resulted in 1972 legislation that
demands the use of trade embargoes against countries that do not
protect dolphin in the same manner as the United States.'
A particular concern of the lawmakers in 1972 was the alleged
high incidental taking of dolphin by yellowfin tuna fishers using
purse seines in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.2 In that region,
dolphin and porpoises travel in close proximity to yellowfin tuna,
usually sitting on top of the tuna. 3 Fishers, observing the dolphin,
deploy purse seines to collect the tuna and in so doing may also en-
tangle and capture the dolphin who frequently panic and drown.4
Pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), an import
embargo must be levied against yellowfin tuna originating from the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean where the harvesting country does not
meet the standards set in the MMPA. 5
Despite attempts by fishers from Mexico to comply with the re-
quirements of the MMPA, 6 in 1990, an embargo was placed upon
yellowfin tuna and tuna products from Mexico.7 Mexico complained
that the tuna embargo was inconsistent with obligations owed to
Mexico under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).8 The September 1991 report of a three-member panel of
experts, established pursuant to the third-party dispute settlement
procedures of the GATT, determined that the American embargo on
Mexican tuna, even though designed to conserve dolphin, was incon-
sistent with the GATT.9
I Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), Pub. L. No. 92-252, § 101(a)(2),
86 Stat. 1027, 1030 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988)). Dolphins are not consid-
ered an endangered species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature March 3, 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 993
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. Dolphins are listed within Appendix It, however,
which indicates that while not endangered at this time they may become so unless trade is
controlled. Id. App. II, 243 U.N.T.S. at 264-69. See SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILD-
LIFE LAw 244 (1985).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4148 [hereinafter 1972 MMPA REPORT].
3 See United States - Restrictions in Imports of Tuna, Report of the GATT Panel, August
16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico GA7T Panel].
4 The estimates on the number of dolphins killed varies considerably. In 1972 it was
estimated that between 200 and 400 thousand dolphins were killed per year. 1972 MMPA
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4148. In 1987, it was estimated that non-U.S. fleets killed over
103 thousand dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6156.
5 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
6 See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
7 Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,236 (1990). See infra
notes 18 and 21 and accompanying text.
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The United States is an original member of
GATF, while Mexico only became a member in 1986.
9 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1623.
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The finding of the GATT Panel against the United States on the
main issue, while correct as a matter of trade law and predicted by
commentators,' 0 raises questions about the manner in which inter-
national trade law can operate to constrain states by taking action to
protect the environment and to conserve natural resources.II The
GATT Panel was aware of this problem and specifically commented
on the way in which states could rectify the conflict between trade
and the environment.' 2 The purpose of this Article is to examine the
conclusions of the GATF Panel report, the implications of these con-
clusions, and the ways suggested by the Panel to resolve trade and
environment conflicts. Despite the perceived negative impact of the
GATT Panel report on conservation efforts, this Article concludes
that the GAFF Panel report has a positive message: what is neces-
sary is not an overhaul of the GATF, but a greater international con-
sensus on permissible conservation and environmental measures.
II. Background
The Marine Mammal Protection Act requires an import embargo
on yellowfin tuna and tuna products originating from the eastern
tropical Pacific Ocean unless the harvesting country provides evi-
dence that its regulatory program governing the incidental taking of
dolphin is comparable to that of the United States and that the inci-
dental taking of dolphin per vessel is comparable to that of the
United States.' 3 The type of regulatory program and the relevant
catch-rates that a country must have are detailed in the legislation
and regulations. 14
Mexico's tuna fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean is
conducted inside international waters, outside American waters, and
within the Mexican 200-nautical mile zone.' 5 No international treaty
10 See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop
Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477,
490-95, 511-25 (1991).
I One commentator stated:
There is a latent conflict between international trade and environmental pro-
tection. A free world trade rests on the exploitation of comparative cost ad-
vantages and hence also of cost advantages that arise from different national
environmental conditions and environmental policies; it requires free access
of all producers to national markets. Environmental policy is interventionist
policy which, in the case of national product requirements . . . creates non-
tariff barriers to trade or, in the case of national production requirements...
imposes additional costs on national industry.
Eckard Rehbinder, Environmental Protection and the Law of International Trade in THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 357 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1985).
12 U.S.-Mexico GAIT Panel, supra note 3, at 1623.
'3 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988). See McDorman, supra note 10, at 492-94 (outlin-
ing the evolution of the MMPA requirements).
14 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988); Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Inci-
dental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 50 C.F.R. 216.24(e)(5) (1991). The require-
ments are briefly described in U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1599.
15 See Linda Lucas Hudgins, The Development of the Mexican Tuna Industry, 1976-1986, in
1992]
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exists by which Mexico is bound to a particular standard regarding
its tuna fishery and its incidental taking of dolphin.16 Hence, Mexico
is not in breach of any international treaties in its incidental taking of
dolphin.
Mexico endeavoured to meet the U.S. requirements and to re-
duce the incidental taking of dolphin. Mexico submitted documenta-
tion to the United States in 1990 which was reviewed and accepted as
meeting the standards of the MMPA. 17 Litigation commenced by an
environmental group eventually led to an embargo being placed on
yellowfin tuna and tuna products from Mexico on the grounds that
the Department of Commerce could not allow imports from coun-
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TUNA INDUSTRY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION: AN ANALYSIS OF
OPTIONS 153-68 (David J. Doulman ed. 1987) (concerning the Mexican tuna fishery).
See also Biliana Cicin-Sain, Michael K. Orbach, Stephen J. Sellers, & Enrique
Manzanilla, Conflictual Interdependence. United States-Mexican Relations in Fisheries Resources, 26
NAT. RESOURCES J. 769 (1986) (providing a review of United States- Mexican fisheries rela-
tions). One of the most difficult issues between the United States and Mexico has been
their differing views on tuna. When Mexico established its 200-n. mile zone in 1976,juris-
diction was claimed over all living resources in the zone, including tuna. Id. at 775. The
American 200-n. mile fishing zone, also established in 1976, excluded tuna from U.S. juris-
diction. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(14), 1812 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). The U.S. view was that tuna was not subject to coastal state jurisdiction.
See William T. Burke, Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L.J. 273, 303-10 (1984). Under U.S. law, foreign states seizing U.S. tuna fishers had
embargoes placed against tuna originating from those states. 16 U.S.C. § 1825 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990). See McDorman, supra note 10, 501-04. This peculiar American view of
tuna has recently been altered, and tuna is now included in the U.S. fisheries jurisdiction.
Fishery Conservation Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-627, § 103, 104 Stat. 4436,
4439 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1812 (Supp. 11 1990)).
16 Given the highly migratory nature of tuna, countries have frequently agreed to
multilateral treaties to assist in the transboundary management of tuna. For the eastern
tropical Pacific Ocean region, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
was established in 1950. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-America Tropical
Tuna Commission, opened for signature May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230, 80 U.N.T.S. 3. The
United States has been a member of the IATTC since the Commission's beginning. Mex-
ico joined in 1964 but withdrew in 1978 following a disagreement on quotas for Mexican
tuna fishers. Alberto Szhkely, Yellow-Fin Tuna: A Transboundary Resource of the Eastern Pacific,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1051, 1060 (1989). With the establishment of 200-n. mile fishing
zones in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IATTC effectively fell into disarray. The
tension was between coastal states, like Mexico, and distant-water fishing interests, like the
United States, who could not agree on a new arrangement for dealing with tuna. See
Gordon R. Munro, Extended Jurisdiction and the Management of Pacific Highly Migratory Species,
21 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 289, 294-95 (1990). Both the United States and Mexico have
been involved in efforts to develop a new tuna organization in the eastern Pacific Ocean.
The American effort resulted in a 1983 convention which contained no conservation re-
gime, did not include Mexico, and has not come into force. Szhkely, supra, at 1062; Munro,
supra, at 295. Mexico's leadership resulted in 1989 in the Eastern Pacific Tuna Organiza-
tion which is not yet functional and has not achieved a Latin American consensus. See
Sz~kely, supra, at 1062- 65; Munro, supra, at 295-96. No multilateral treaties exist, however,
regarding the conservation or management of dolphins. As one commentator noted:
"[T]he lack of any serious effort to protect dolphins worldwide evinces the real priority
given to this problem." John Warren Kindt, A Summary of Issues Involving Marine Mammals
and Highly Migratory Species, 18 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8 (1984). Dolphins have largely remained
a singular American concern.
17 Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,730 (1990) (emphasis
added).
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tries which do not strictly comply with the requirements of the
MMPA.18
In late 1990, Mexico, through the GATT, consulted with the
United States about the trade aspects of the embargo on tuna.19 Fol-
lowing the consultations, Mexico requested that a GATT panel of
experts be asked to look into the dispute, and in February of 1991, a
panel was established. 20
In March of 1991 another embargo under the MMPA was put in
place against Mexican yellowfin tuna and tuna products. 2 ' Two
months later, pursuant to the MMPA,2 2 the United States imposed
an embargo against intermediary countries (specifically Costa Rica,
France, Italy, Japan and Panama) exporting to the United States yel-
lowfin tuna or tuna products originating from Mexican harvests per-
formed in a manner inconsistent with the dolphin-taking standards
of the MMPA. 2s
If an embargo is still in place six months following its imposi-
tion, it has to be certified to the President of the United States, 24 and
such certification is to be deemed a certification under the Pelly
18 The litigation was commenced in August 1990 to obtain an injunction against the
Department of Commerce prohibiting the entry of yellowfin tuna until foreign countries
complied with the requirements of the MMPA. The injunction was granted. Earth Island
Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In September 1990, it was
determined that Mexico had complied with requirements of the MMPA. Taking and Im-
porting of Marine Mammals, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,730 (1990).
In October 1990 another injunction was obtained specifically against the import of
yellowfin tuna from Mexico on the grounds that insufficient information had been
presented in order to comply with the MMPA. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929
F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1991). This injunction was stayed by an order of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in November 1990. The stay issued by the Court of Appeals
was lifted in February 1991. In April 1991, the Court of Appeals upheld the August 1990
lower court decision to issue the injunction. Id. at 1449; see also U.S.-Mexico GA 77 Panel,
supra note 3, at 1599-1600 (further describing the proceedings).
19 U.S.-Mexico GA 7T Panel, supra note 3, at 1598.
20 Id. Panels cannot be established unless both countries to a dispute agree to have a
panel investigate the dispute. Hence, the United States agreed to Mexico's request to
establish the dispute settlement panel. The dispute settlement procedures of the GATT
have evolved through practice, and the procedure utilized is not found in the GATT docu-
ment itself. For a discussion of GATT dispute settlement procedures, see Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATE Doc. [14907, 26
GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 210 (1980); Improvements to the
GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, GATT Doc. [U6489, 36 GATE BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 61 (1990); Eric Canal-Forgues & Rudolf Ostrihan-
sky, New Developments in the GA7-T Dispute Settlement Procedures, J. WORLD TRADE L., April
1990, at 67; WilliamJ. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987);
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 94-100 (1989).
21 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1600. See also Taking and Importing of
Marine Mammals, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,096 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (notice of embargo).
22 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1988).
23 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1600. See also Taking and Importing of
Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,606
(Dep't Comm. 1991), correcting 56 Fed. Reg. 26,995 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (notice to
importers).
24 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (1988).
1992]
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Amendment,2 5 which could lead to an import ban on any or all fish
and fish products originating from Mexico.2 6 At the time of the
Panel report, Mexico had 'not been certified under the Pelly Amend-
ment. 27 The Pelly Amendment requires that any trade action taken
by the U.S President pursuant to it' must be "sanctioned" by the
GATT.28
Mexico was also concerned about the application of the labelling
provisions of the United States Dolphin Protection Consumer Infor-
mation Act (DPCIA) to tuna products from Mexico. 29 Under this
legislation tuna products originating from the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean cannot be labelled as "dolphin safe" unless the harvesting
vessels can show that they have minimized, in the appropriate man-
ner, the incidental taking of dolphin 30
III. The Report of the Panel
A. The Import Embargo on Tuna From Mexico
1. Article XI(1) or Article 111(4)
The principal Mexican argument against the U.S. embargoes
was that they were inconsistent with Article XI(l) of the GAT'I'. t
Article XI(l) prohibits countries from imposing quantitative restric-
tions (quotas) or quantitative prohibitions on imports.3 2 Such re-
strictions are inconsistent with the GAIT objectives of the free flow
of goods, the operation of comparative advantage, and the efficient
allocation of world resources.3 3
The United States took the view that the appropriate provision
was not Article XI(l) but the national treatment obligation, Article
111(4), which allows countries to impose internal regulations on im-
ported products provided that the regulation does not discriminate
between foreign and domestic products and is not applied in a man-
25 Id.; Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988)). The history and operation of the Pelly Amendment
is discussed in detail in McDorman, supra note 10, at 482-90.
26 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1988).
27 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1618-19.
28 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1988).
29 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp.
11 1990).
30 Id. §§ 1385(d)(1)(B), 1385(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
31 U.S.-Mexico GA7T Panel, supra note 3, at 1617-19.
32 GATT Article XI(I) states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory
of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 8, art. XI, $ 1, at A32-A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
33 See JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 305-16 (1969).
466 [VOL. 17
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ner affording protection to domestic production. 34 The essence of
the American argument was that dolphin-taking standards on tuna
fishing were internal measures applied to both American and non-
American fishers equally, and hence, met the requirement of na-
tional treatment in Article 1II(4). 35 The fact that the regulation had
effect at the border was argued as not being fatal to the U.S. position
that the embargo was an internal measure because of the interpreta-
tive note to Article III (Note Ad Article III),s6 which provides that:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to
an imported product and the like domestic product and is collected
or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point
34 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1602-04. The key paragraphs of GATT
Article III are:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indi-
rectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the princi-
ples set forth in paragraph 1.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transpor-
tation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GAIT, supra note 8, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-06, as amended by Protocol
Modifying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62 Stat. 3679, 62
U.N.T.S. 80.
35 A 1990 third party dispute settlement panel established pursuant to the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 102 Stat.
1851, accepted the U.S. argument that a size limitation on lobster imposed on both Ameri-
can and foreign (Canadian) lobster fell under the national treatment obligations of GATF
Article III and not under Article XI(I) even though the regulation operated to exclude
certain Canadian lobster from the U.S. market. See UNITED STATES-CANADA BINATIONAL
PANEL, LOBSTERS FROM CANADA-FINAL REPORT OF THE FTA PANEL, CASE No. USA-84-
1807-01, 3 Can. Trade & Commodity Tax Cases (CCH) 8182, 8182-83 (1990) [hereinafter
LOBSTERS FROM CANADA]. Moreover, the U.S. regulation took effect at the border which
raised questions as to whether the measure was truly an internal measure. Id. The Panel
concluded on the basis of Note Ad Article III that merely because the regulation took
effect at the border did not preclude the regulation from being an internal measure. Id.
For jurisdictional reasons, the Panel did not reach a conclusion whether the American size
requirement for all lobster complied with the national treatment obligation. Id. See gener-
ally Ted L. McDorman, Dissecting the Free Trade Agreement Lobster Panel Decision, 18 CAN. Bus.
L.J. 445 (1991) (discussing the U.S.- Canadian lobster dispute).
36 U.S.-Mexico GA TT Panel, supra note 3, at 1603. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or
other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the
provisions of Article III.
Based upon these provisions, the U.S. claimed that the direct import
embargo constituted at the border enforcement of the MMPA re-
quirement that all tuna from the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean be
harvested in the appropriate dolphin-friendly manner.3 7
The GATI' Panel noted that the MMPA did not regulate the
tuna itself, nor did it regulate the sale of tuna in the United States. 38
In short, the U.S. measure was unrelated to the tuna but went to the
manner in which the tuna was caught.
In examining Article III(1) and 111(4) and Note Ad Article III,
the GATT Panel determined that the provisions dealt only with
measures affecting the product being traded.3 9 This conclusion was
based on the wording of the provisions, such as Article 111(4), where
it is stated that imported products are to be accorded no less favour-
able treatment than like domestic products are accorded by internal
laws.40 Article 111(1), which contains the general principle of national
treatment, refers to the application of internal laws affecting prod-
ucts and requires that such regulations on products are not to be
applied to protect domestic production. 41 Similarly, Note Ad Article
III covers only measures applying to imported products. 4 2 The
Panel also considered two previous panel reports dealing with Arti-
cle 111(2) and III(4), 4 3 and concluded that the national treatment
provisions envisioned a comparison "between the measures applied
to imported products and the measures applied to like domestic
products." '4 4 Finally, the Panel noted a 1970 Working Panel Report
on Border Tax Adjustment 4 5 which concluded that border tax ad-
justments could be applied only for those taxes directly borne by the
37 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1603.
38 Id. at 1617.
39 Id. at 1618 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 1616 (emphasis added).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 The first panel report involved a differential internal tax imposed by the United
States. In interpreting Article 111(2), the panel concluded that the obligation was to estab-
lish "competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic products."
United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT Doc. L/6175, 34
GATT BAsic INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS SuPP. 136, 158 (1988). The second
report involved a U.S. law which created a special administrative process for dealing with
foreign products alleged to infringe U.S. patent law. The panel examined Article 111(4)
and determined that the wording "treatment no less favourable" called for equality of
opportunity for foreign products. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT
Doc. L/6439, 36 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 345, 386-87
(1990).
44 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1617-18.
45 Border Tax Adjustments, GATT Doc. L/3464, 18 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS SuPP. 97 (1972).
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product and not for those borne indirectly by the product.46 Based
upon this analysis the Panel concluded that the provisions of the
MMPA dealing with imported Mexican tuna were not internal meas-
ures covered by Note Ad Article III, since the regulations did not
affect the tuna as a product.47 Moreover, for the same reasons, the
U.S. regulations did not comply with Article 111(4):
Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the tak-
ing of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. Article 111:4
therefore obliges the United States to accord treatment to Mexican
tuna no less favourable than that accorded to United States tuna,
whether or not the incidental taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels
corresponds to that of United States vessels.4 8
Having rejected the U.S. argument with respect to the applica-
tion of national treatment, the Panel determined that the U.S. em-
bargo was inconsistent with Article XI(1), which prohibits
quantitative restrictions. 4 9 The United States did not present any ar-
guments to counter this position.5 0 The United States, however, re-
lied upon two exceptions to justify the breach of Article XI(l):
Article XX(b), respecting the protection of animal life, and Article
XX(g), respecting conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
2. Article XX(b) - Protection of Animal Life
The United States posited that its import embargo on Mexican
tuna was justified under Article XX(b) 5 I because the embargo served
the purpose of protecting dolphin life and health and was "neces-
sary" because the measure adopted was the only one reasonably
available to protect dolphin life and health outside U.S. jurisdic-
tion.52 In reviewing the Article XX exceptions, the Panel indicated
that previous panels placed the burden of showing compliance with
the exceptions upon the party seeking their advantage and con-
cluded that the exceptions were to be read narrowly. 53 The Panel
noted that Article XX was "a limited and conditional exception" to
46 U.S.-Mexico GA7T Panel, supra note 3, at 1618.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 GAYF Article XX(b) states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
GATT, supra note 8, art. 11(b), 61 Stat. at A14, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200. See McDorman, supra
note 10, at 521- 23.
52 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1606.
53 Id. at 1619. See Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT
Doc. [U5504, 30 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS SuPP. 140, 164
1992] 469
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the GATT obligations and that Article XX did not establish positive
obligations on parties. 54 Given this background, the Panel pro-
ceeded to examine the central aspect of the U.S. argument with re-
spect to the applicability of Article XX(b): whether it could be used
to protect the life and health of animals outside the United States.55
The Panel concluded that Article XX(b) would not justify trade
embargoes for the purpose of protecting the health and life of ani-
mals outside the jurisdiction of the country imposing the embargo.56
The Panel conceded that nothing explicit in the wording of Article
XX(b) provided this answer,57 but when turning to the drafting his-
tory of the exception, the Panel found that the concern of the draft-
ers was with the "life or health of humans, animals or plants within
the jurisdiction of the importing country."58 More importantly, the
Panel concluded that if one country could dictate to others the
health, safety and conservation laws that must be followed in order
to conduct trade, then trade could take place only between states
with identical internal regulations. This conclusion was described as
follows:
The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article
XX(b) suggested by the United States were accepted, each con-
tracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health policies
from which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeop-
ardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General
Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral frame-
work for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal
security only in respect of trade between a limited number of con-
tracting parties with identical internal regulations. 59
The Panel also noted the "necessary" criterion of Article XX(b)
and commented that what must be necessary was the remedy of the
trade embargo, and not the general protection of life or health. 60
Thus, the Panel concluded that even if the extrajurisdictional argu-
ment could be overcome, the U.S. measure was not necessary since
other avenues, such as negotiating international cooperative ar-
rangements, existed to pursue its dolphin protection objectives. 6'
(1984); United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 43, at 393. In neither
case was the reliance on an Article XX exception successful.
54 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1619.
55 Id. at 1619-20 (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 1620.
57 Id. at 1619-20.
58 Id. at 1620. For a contrary view of the drafting history and the meaning to be given
Article XX(b) and (g) respecting extraterritorial application, see Steve Charnovitz, Explor-
ing the Environmental Exceptions in GATTArticle XXJ. WORLD TRADE L., Oct. 1991, at 37, 52-
53.
59 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1620.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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3. Article XX(g) - Conservation of Scarce Natural Resources
As an alternative to Article XX(b), the United States sought to
justify its import prohibition under Article XX(g), arguing that the
embargo on tuna was primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphin
and that the import embargo was primarily aimed at rendering effec-
tive the restrictions existing in the United States on the production
and consumption of dolphin. 62 The Panel noted that Article XX(g)
required that an import embargo had to be utilized in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption and that
any embargo had to be "primarily aimed at" rendering the domestic
restrictions effective:6 3
A country can effectively control the production or consumption of
an exhaustible natural resource only to the extent that the produc-
tion or consumption is under its jurisdiction. This suggests that Ar-
ticle XX(g) was intended to permit contracting parties to take trade
measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on pro-
duction or consumption within their jurisdiction. 64
Similar to its view of the extrajurisdictional interpretation of Article
XX(b), the Panel concluded that a country could not use a trade em-
bargo to conserve resources in another country and justify the action
under Article XX(g). 6 5
The Panel concluded that the U.S. embargo on tuna imposed
pursuant to the MMPA was inconsistent with Article XI(1) of the
GATT and not justified under either Article XX(b) or XX(g). 6 6
B. The Import Embargo on Intermediary Nations
The U.S. argument regarding the tuna embargo under the
MMPA against intermediary nations seeking to sell yellowfin tuna
and tuna products harvested by Mexico with an incidental dolphin
kill unacceptable to the United States, was the same as its argument
with respect to the direct embargo.6 7 The Panel handled the argu-
ments respecting the applicability of Article 111(4) and Note Ad Arti-
cle III, Article XI(1), and the exceptions Article XX(b) and (g), by
62 Id. at 1607. See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 50-51 (discussing Article XX(g)).
63 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1620-2 1. The interpretation that a mea-
sure has to be "primarily aimed at" rendering the domestic measures effective in order to
be justified under Article XX(g) arose in Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. L/6268, 35 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED Docu-
MENTs Supp. 98, 114 (1989). See also McDorman, supra note 10, at 518-19 (discussion of
Canada-U.S. tuna case involving Article XX(g)).
64 U.S.-Mexico GAT Panel, supra note 3, at 1620-21.
65 Id. at 1621. The Panel considered that if the extrajurisdictional interpretation of
Article XX(g) suggested by the United States were accepted, each contracting party could
unilaterally determine the conservation policies from which other contracting parties
could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. Id.
66 Id. at 1623.
67 Id. at 1602, 1621.
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referring to its findings on the direct embargo issue.68 The result,
therefore, was that the import embargo on tuna from intermediary
countries imposed under the MMPA was also inconsistent with the
obligations of the United States under the GAF. 69
C. The Pelly Amendment
The Panel did not agree with the Mexican argument that the
Pelly Amendment was also inconsistent with the GAT Article XI(1)
insomuch as it contained the possibility of the employment of import
embargoes. 70 The Panel concluded, based upon previous panel re-
ports,7 ' that because the Pelly Amendment did not require trade
measures to be taken, the provision was not inconsistent with the
GATT.72
D. The "Dolphin Safe" Labelling Provision
Mexico argued that the labelling provisions of the DPCIA were
inconsistent with GAT Article IX(l) which requires an importing
country to treat like products in the same manner respecting "mark-
ing requirements. ' 73 In the alternative, Mexico argued that the la-
belling provisions were inconsistent with Article I(1), the most-
favoured-nation requirement, because Mexican tuna was discrimi-
nated against since it originated from the eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean. 74 The Panel quickly dismissed the Mexican argument that
the "Dolphin Safe" labelling provision of the DPCIA was inconsis-
tent with GATF Article IX(l) by noting that the GATT obligation
related only to labelling regarding the origin of the product and not
to labelling regarding the product generally. 75
The Mexican argument that the labelling provision was inconsis-
tent with Article I(1), most-favoured-nation, was also rejected. The
Panel took the view that the key question was whether "the right of
access to the label" met the non-discriminatory principles of most-
favoured-nation. 76 The Panel focused upon this issue since the la-
belling provision was voluntary in that tuna products could be sold
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1623.
70 Id. at 1616, 1619.
71 United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, supra note 43, at 160,
163-64; European Economic Community - Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT
Doc. L/6657, 37 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 132, 198-99
(1991).
72 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1619.
73 Id. at 1622.
74 Id. Mexico argued that, under GAT, like products had to be treated alike regard-
less of source. Therefore, the United States could not treat Mexican tuna less favourably
than other tuna. Such non-discriminatory treatment of like products is recognized as the
essence of the most-favoured- nation obligation. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 133-38.
75 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1622.
76 Id.
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without the "Dolphin Safe" label, and that no benefit was obtained
from the government by having or not having the "Dolphin Safe"
label affixed to the product.77 The Panel noted that: "Any advantage
which might possibly result from access to this label depends on the
free choice of consumers to give preference to tuna carrying the
'Dolphin Safe' label." '78
IV. Implications of the Report
A. Trade Measures Because Foreign Production is Environmentally-
Unfriendly
The principal implication of the U.S. -Mexico GA TT Panel report is
that measures taken against environmentally-friendly products
(tuna) because they were produced in an environmentally-unfriendly
manner (unacceptable taking of dolphin) are inconsistent with the
GATT. Countries cannot look behind a good to determine if the
production or manufacturing process was environmentally-
friendly.79
The GAIT Panel dealt with the two manners in which a country
might try to restrict goods because of their production processes.
The first situation is where a state requires that all goods (foreign or
domestic) sold in the country be produced in an environmentally-
friendly manner. The Panel concluded that the principle of national
treatment in Article III was inappropriate since Article III covered
only laws applying to the product itself and not to laws dealing with
the manner of production.80 The second situation involves a direct
embargo on a good because of the manufacturing process. This is a
primafacie violation of Article XI(I), 8 l and can only be GATT-consis-
tent if an exception can be utilized. The GATT Panel concluded that
if the resource (or environment) being protected was outside the em-
bargoing country then no exception existed to permit such an
embargo.8 2
The conclusions of the Panel are consistent with the GAIT's
focus upon trade in goods and measures which directly affect the
trade of goods.8 3 National laws categorized as investment laws, of
77 Id. at 1616, 1622.
78 Id. at 1622.
79 If the product itself is environmentally-unfriendly, then a country could utilize
trade measures against the product. These protective trade measures could be justified
under exception XX(b) as necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. JACK-
SON, supra note 20, at 208.
80 See supra section III.A.1.
81 The United States did not contest that its tuna embargo violated Article XI().
U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1618.
82 See supra sections III.A.2. and III.A.3.
83 One commentator stated: "The primary subject matter of the GAIT has always
been recognized as trade in goods .. " EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REG-
ULATION 13 (1986). Another leading authority noted: "GATT is a legal instrument primar-
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which environmental regulation of manufacturing processes would
be a part, are not subject to GATT discipline.8 4 Moreover, the con-
clusions of the Panel are consistent with academic opinion. The
leading American trade academic predicted the outcome of GATT's
application to the manufacturing processes when he stated: "The
GATT obligation [Article III] does not allow for differential treat-
ment based on characteristics of the production process rather than
of the product itself."85 He also argued that the Article XX(b) ex-
ception was only applicable for protection of health and safety within
the importing country. 86 He concluded that "to a certain extent, this
is what comparative advantage is all about: differences in environ-
ments of production, including the environment of government reg-
ulation."'8 7 There is even a forty year old panel report, though not
referred to by the GATT Panel in its findings, which determined a
domestic tax applied to products from countries where employers
did not pay family allowance taxes equivalent to those paid in the
importing country was GAT'-inconsistent.88 While the decision wasbased on most-favoured nation, the underlying principle against dis-
crimination based on national law and standards unrelated to the
traded product is important. Finally, it should be noted that not one
of the eleven countries making representations to the GATT Panel
sided with the U.S. arguments.8 9
ily concerned with products .. " JACKSON, supra note 33, at 259. This authority further
noted that "it was desired to confine GATI to 'goods', leaving other problems to other
agreements." Id. at 257.
84 One can readily understand how this operates in the resources sector. No rule of
GATT requires a country to develop its natural resources. Moreover, if a country wishes
to develop its natural resources, it can make the resources available only to its own citi-
zens. GATT does not prevent such discrimination. Only where the resources become
goods to be sold does the GATF have effect. In the fisheries context, laws reserving quo-
tas to domestic fishers are not challengeable under the GATT. But laws requiring the
fishers to sell to domestic buyers and hence inhibiting goods available for export sale are
challengeable under the GAT. See Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, supra note 63, at 98. The current round of GATF negotiations, the Uruguay
Round, is examining the possibility of expanding the GAT rules to trade related invest-
ment measures (TRIMs). However, this is still restricted in effect. See GATT ACTIVITIES
1990, 46-48 (1991); Paul R. Grahman & Edward M. Krugman, Trade-Related Investment
Measures in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND 147-63 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990). It has
been noted that GATT regulates only the trade of goods and not foreign direct investment
policies. See Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, supra note 53, at 157.
85 JACKSON, supra note 20, at 193.
86 Id. at 209. See also J. Owen Saunders, Legal Aspects of Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment, in THE LEGAL CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 370, 375 (J. Owen Saunders
ed., 1990); McDorman, supra note 10, at 520.
87 JACKSON, supra note 20, at 209.
88 Belgian Family Allowances, GAT Doc. G/32 (Nov. 7, 1952), 1 GATT BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 59 (1953). For a discussion of the Belgian Family
Allowances case, including the text of the Panel report itself, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 121-32 (1975).
89 The intervening countries were Australia, Canada, the European Community, In-
donesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand and Venezuela. See
U.S.- Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1610-16.
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The GATT Panel stated that under the treaty "a contracting
party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own." 90 It is this statement that has been seen as the biggest prob-
lem with the GATT Panel report from an environmentalist's point of
view.9 1 However, even the normally environmentally-sensitive Nor-
dic countries indicated that a country is not free "to require that im-
ported products [be] produced as cleanly abroad as at home."'9 2 Any
other conclusion reached by the GAIT Panel would allow certain
countries to dictate to others what standards must exist, and this
would clearly be an invasion of a country's sovereignty.9 3 Moreover,
as the Panel observed, any other conclusion would permit trade only
between countries with identical regulations, and would amount to a
dismantling of the GATT.9 4
B. Environmental Labelling
The report of the Panel indicates that a government-established
program for environmental labelling creates no problem under the
GAT provided that (1) the program is voluntary, (2) that all like
products, regardless of origin, have access to the program, and (3)
that no government benefit is conferred by meeting the labelling
requirements.95
C. American Unilateralism
It has become a popular argument in the United States that un-
less the environmental standards, wage rates, industrial safety, anti-
trust legislation, etc. in a foreign country are equivalent to those in
the United States, a level playing field does not exist, and American
unilateral trade action is permissible to equalize the competition.
This concern was expressed in the MMPA tuna embargo litigation
when the Northern District Court of California said that the embargo
"would help to protect United States fishermen and women from un-
fair competition from the vessels of foreign nations which engage in
fishing practices which may be less expensive, but which result in
90 Id. at 1622.
91 See Divine porpoise, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 31.
92 EFTA members press convening of working party, 82 Focus: GATT NEwsL.,July 1991, at
2,3.
93 The Venezuelan intervention in the Panel Report commented on this as follows:
Potentially, any nation could thereby justify unilaterally imposing its own so-
cial, economic or employment standards as a criterion for accepting imports.
Any influential contracting party could effectively regulate the internal envi-
ronment of others simply by erecting trade barriers based on unilateral envi-
ronment policies.
U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1615.
94 Id. at 1620.
95 See supra section III.D.
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higher dolphin kill rates." 96
When the emotion-laden dolphin factor is stripped away from
the facts before the U.S. -Mexico GATT Panel, what the Panel had to
deal with was an American trade measure unilaterally employed be-
cause a country did not meet standards defined by the U.S. The par-
allel between this situation and the potential utilization of embargoes
under U.S. trade law section 301, 9 7 against countries where the
United States determines that American exports are being treated
unfairly, 98 would not have escaped the notice of the GATT Panel.
The possible use of trade embargoes under section 301 has been
denounced at the GATT,99 and the GAT- consistency of such
measures has been strongly doubted.100 Without confronting section
301 directly, the GATT Panel made it clear that American trade
measures unilaterally employed because another country has differ-
ent laws and standards, although not facially inconsistent with GATT
or other law, are inconsistent in application with the GATT.
96 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1990). It
may be argued that if a country has high environmental standards on processing, embar-
goes designed to keep products out which are not produced in an environmentally-
friendly manner are measures designed to protect the environment. The effect of the em-
bargo, however, is to protect the domestic producer. Given that the environment of the
embargoing country will not be affected if the product is produced elsewhere, it is difficult
for that country to assert a true environmental purpose for the embargo. A variation on
this theme is the so-called "social tariff" designed to equalize costs of production where
pollution (or other) standards are lower. See Duane Chapman, Environmental Standards and
International Trade in Automobiles and Copper: The Case for a Social Tariff, 31 NAT. RESOURCESJ.
449 (1991).
97 Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2041 (codified as
amended in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988 and Supp. 11 1990)) (commonly referred to as
"section 301"). The potential for use of this section 301 sanction was significantly ex-
panded by amendments made in 1988. For a comprehensive and unparalleled discussion
of section 301 and its 1988 offspring, "Super 301" and "Special 301," see AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM].
98 Pursuant to section 301, it is the task of the U.S. Trade Representative to examine
whether U.S. exports are being burdened by unfair laws and practices of foreign countries.
What the U.S. trade authorities are looking for is any act, policy or practice of a foreign
government which is "unjustifiable," "unreasonable," or "discriminatory" and burdens or
restricts U.S. commerce. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 l(a)(l)(B), 241 l(b)(1), 2414(a)(1) (1988). It is
the unreasonable criteria that has the broadest definition since it can include acts, policies
or practices that "while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the interna-
tional legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable." 19 U.S.C.
§ 241 l(d)(3)(A) (1988). The U.S. legislation explicitly indicates that an unreasonable act,
policy or practice includes ones which constitute a denial of workers' rights and standards
for minimum workers' wages, health and safety. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988).
There is a degree of discretion in the use of trade sanctions authorized by section 301.
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 (a), 241 (b) (1988). In only nine cases up to 1989 has trade retalia-
tion been employed pursuant to section 301. Robert E. Hudec, Thinking about the New
Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 97, at 121-22,
153-56.
99 Unilateral measures underfire, 63 Focus: GATT NEWSL., July 1989, at 6, 7.
100 Hudec, supra note 98, at 119-23, 144-51; Elizabeth J. King, Comment, The Omnibus
Trade Bill of 1988: "Super 301 "and Its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System Under the GA TT,
12 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 245, 262-68 (1991).
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IV. Solutions to Trade and Environment Conflicts
A. The Problem
The dispute before the U.S. -Mexico GA TT Panel was a confronta-
tion between a trade value, the unimpeded flow of goods, and an
environmental value, the conservation of dolphin. It can be convinc-
ingly argued that the value of conserving a special resource should
outweigh the economics and principles of free trade. The GATT
Panel concluded, however, based on the wording of the GATT, that
the trade value took precedence over the environmental value in the
situation before it.
Environmental issues and concerns are not excluded from con-
sideration under the GATT rules. 101 A balancing between trade
and the environment is to take place. This is most clearly exempli-
fied in Article XX(g) wherein measures primarily aimed at conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources are permitted, even if the
measures are inconsistent with other GATT rules. Concerning the
balance to be struck, a dispute settlement panel, established pursu-
ant to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, commented that Arti-
cle XX(g) "exists to ensure that the provisions of the GATT do not
prevent the governments from pursuing their conservation policies"
but that "it is not necessary that Article XX(g) exempt from prohibi-
tion every measure that has a conservation-promoting effect."' 0 2
The U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel concluded that the intent of Article
XX(g) (and (b)), and its wording and underlying policy did not allow
the Panel to permit an import embargo seeking to protect resources
and the environment outside the jurisdiction of the embargoing coun-
try. 10 3 Clearly, the Panel did not feel that this was a situation in
which balancing trade and environment concerns was appropriate
because of the serious detriment to trade that would occur if the U.S.
argument prevailed.
It can be suggested that the answer was predetermined because
the forum of the dispute was trade-dominated.10 4 This argument,
while not without merit, is not particularly convincing in the situa-
tion of the U.S.-Mexico dolphin and tuna dispute. The GATT Panel,
or for that matter any other international dispute settlement body,
does not have the luxury of simply determining which value, trade or
environment, should prevail. The Panel had to determine the ex-
isting obligations and the wording thereof and no international envi-
101 See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 52-53.
102 CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE COMMISSION PANEL, FINAL REPORT, CANADA'S LAND-
ING REQUIREMENT FOR PACIFIC COAST SALMON AND HERRING, 2 Can. Trade & Commodity
Tax Cases (CCH) 7162, 7172 (1989) [hereinafter CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE COMMIS-
SION PANEL REPORT]. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
1o3 See supra sections III.A.2 and III.A.3.
104 See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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ronmental or conservation obligations existed on both countries
regarding dolphins or the manner in which tuna was to be har-
vested. 10 5 Thus, in the conflict between trade and environment,
there existed international trade law obligations, but no competing
international environmental or conservation obligations. The Aus-
tralian intervention in the Panel dealt with this point as follows:
"[W]here a contracting party takes a [trade] measure with extraterri-
torial application outside of any international framework for cooperation, it
is appropriate for the GATT to scrutinize the measure against that
party's obligations under the General Agreement. ' 106
The interaction between trade and environment is attracting
considerable attention, and the U.S. -Mexico GA TT Panel report can be
expected to increase that attention. At the GATT, a working group
on Environmental Measures and International Trade has recently
been established. 10 7 The work of the group is to become a key focus
of GATT activities following the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round.10 8 A three-point agenda has been agreed upon:
- the relationship between trade provisions in international
environmental agreements and GATT obligations;
- multilateral transparency of national environmental regula-
tions; and
- the trade effects of packaging and labelling requirements
that affect trade.' 0 9
Trade and environment is on the agenda of the 1992 UN Con-
ference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in both the
statement of principles, referred to as either the Earth Charter or the
Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, and
the plan of action referred to as Agenda 21. The statement of princi-
ples is designed to guide people and nations in their conduct to-
wards one another and towards the environment and is to build
upon the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.110 The Chair's Consolidated
Draft of the Principles of General Rights and Obligations"' indi-
105 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
106 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1610-11 (emphasis added).
107 GATT to focus on trade and environment link, 85 Focus: GATT NEWSL., Oct. 1991, at
1.
108 Id.
309 Id.
110 The Stockholm Declaration, which was a product of the 1972 United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment, identified twenty-six principles for the protection
and enhancement of the human environment. Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in part in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)
(hereinafter 1972 Stockholm Declaration). Besides the Stockholm Declaration, the U.N.
Conference also adopted an Action Plan containing over 100 recommendations for envi-
ronmental action. Id. See Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,
14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 423 (1973) (discussing the Stockholm Declaration).
I I I Principles of General Rights and Obligations, Chairman's Consolidated Draft, Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Trade, 3d Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, at 1, Doc. No. A/Conf. 151/PC/WG. II/L.8/Rev. 1 (1991).
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cates that Principle 9 will concern environment and world trade, but
there is little consensus as to its content or even whether the princi-
ple will ultimately be accepted." 12 The structure and organization of
the work plan (Agenda 21) clearly makes reference to the interrela-
tionship of international trade and the environment as being neces-
sary to consider," l3 but it is unclear as to the effect such
consideration will ultimately have.
One cannot simply dismiss the obligations of the GATT where
they conflict with environmental values. Over 100 countries are
party to the General Agreement 1 4 and despite its shortcomings," t 5
it is one of the most highly-developed of international regimes.
Clearly, however, some accommodation between environmental con-
cerns and the trade regime is necessary. The U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel
has provided some insights as to how this accommodation might be
achieved.
B. Trade Measures and the Domestic Environment
The U.S. -Mexico GATT Panel noted that the treaty rules impose
few constraints on policies designed to protect the domestic environ-
ment." 6 The only real qualification would appear to be that any
112 Several proposals have been made which clearly indicate that environmental regu-
lation is not to unduly interfere with free trade. India's proposal states:
Global environmental considerations cannot justify restrictive trade prac-
tices, except when these are introduced in terms of specific provisions in a
globally accepted environmental convention.
Id. at 12. The Republic of Korea's proposal states:
Environmental concerns may not be used as a disguised instrument for im-
peding the development needs of developing countries. Environmental reg-
ulations may not be used as non-tariff barriers or as protectionist measures
against exports of developing countries.
Id. Singapore's contribution states:
The principle of free trade benefits the world economy and promotes the
development of all countries, especially the developing countries. We
should seek to eliminate existing barriers against free trade and resist at-
tempts to build new barriers under the guise of protecting the environment.
Id. at 13.
113 Structure and organization of Agenda 21, Preparatory Committee for the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 2(a), at 2,
Doc. No. A/Conf. 151/PC/L.49 (1991).
114 As ofJanuary 1, 1991, there were 101 contracting parties. GATr AcriVITIES 1990,
supra note 84, at 129.
115 See Colleen Hamilton &John Whalley, The GATT System in the 1990s, 17 J. LEGIS.
167 (1991); James M. Lutz, GA7T Reform or Regime Maintenance: Differing Solutions to World
Trade Problems, J. WORLD TRADE L., April 1991, at 107.
116 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1622. The GATT Panel stated:
(T)he provisions of the General Agreement impose few constraints on a con-
tracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies.... (A)
contracting party [to the GATTI is free to tax or regulate imported products
and like domestic products as long as its taxes or regulations do not discrimi-
nate against imported products or afford protection to domestic producers,
and a contracting party is also free to tax or regulate domestic production for
environmental purposes.
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measure in question- would have to be a bona fide environmental
measure and not a disguised trade measure." 17 Drawing this distinc-
tion is not an easy task, but with increased environmental awareness,
it is not unrealistic to suggest that the presumption should be in fa-
vour of a measure supporting a valid domestic environmental pur-
pose. A 1988 decision of the Court of Justice of the European
Community supports such an approach."l 8 The Court found in fa-
vour of a recycling scheme despite an acknowledged trade effect be-
cause on balance, the restriction on the free movement of goods was
not considered to be disproportionate to the environmental aim of
the measure. '19 Similarly, in the recent Lobster Panel Report under the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the outcome of the decision
(although not the actual finding of the Panel) was that an American
measure assisting the conservation of U.S. lobster was not deter-
mined to be GAIT-inconsistent even though it did have a trade
effect. 120
C. Trade Measures and Foreign Environments
A more difficult issue arose in the U.S.-Mexico GATTPanel, where
a country attempted to deal with environmental issues beyond its
borders. The obligations owed by the United States to Mexico under
the GATT prohibited the use of trade measures to deal with such
117 The Article XX exception to the GATT rules has as one of its criterion that a
measure must not be a disguised restriction on trade. See GATT, supra note 8, art. II, 61
Stat. at A14, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200. Few GATT panels have sought to deal with this criterion.
See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 47-48. However, in the CANADA-U.S. TRADE COMMISSION
PANEL REPORT, supra note 102, the question of whether a measure was a disguised trade
barrier was at the core of the dispute. Id. at 7171. The issue was whether a Canadian
requirement that all salmon and herring caught in Canadian West Coast waters had to be
landed before export was justified under GATT Article XX(g). Id. The Panel determined
that the 100 per cent landing requirement would not have been adopted on the basis of
conservation alone and therefore was a disguised trade barrier. Id. at 7178-79. The Panel
attempted to objectively analyze the operation of the measure rather than subjectively
evaluating the motives for its enactment. Id. at 7172.
118 Case 302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans: E.C. Commission v. Denmark, I C.M.L.R.
619-33 (1989).
119 Id. The Danish law required not only that beer, soft drinks, etc. had to be mar-
keted in approved returnable containers but there had to exist a system of collection and
refilling of the containers such that a large proportion of containers would be refilled. The
law in question went well beyond product standards. Denmark did not seriously contest
that the measure was equivalent to a quantitative restriction under Article 30 of the Treaty
of Rome since the law essentially required non-Danish producers to either set up a refilling
plant in Denmark or ship the empties to the country of origin. Denmark argued, and the
Court accepted, that protection of the environment was a mandatory requirement of EC
law which justified certain restrictions on the principle of the free movement of goods.
The Court, in examining the balance between trade and environment, found that the re-
strictions imposed by the Danish law on the free movement of goods was not dispropor-
tionate to the environmental aim of the measure. Id. For further discussion of the case,
see Toni R. F. Sexton, Note, Enacting National Environmental Laws More Stringent Than Other
States' Laws in the European Community: Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v. Denmark, 24
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 563 (1991).
120 LOBSTERS FROM CANADA REPORT, supra note 35, at 8183.
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environmental issues. 12  The U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel provides two
possible responses to the problem of GATT obligations overriding
environmental concerns in such a situation. The Panel noted that
the GAIT could be changed from within either by an amendment or
through the suspension of obligations pursuant to the waiver proce-
dure under Article XXV(5).' 22 Another possibility was that GATT
obligations could be modified by international agreement.
23
1. Changing the GA TT
With respect to changing the GATT from within, no amend-
ments have been made to the basic text since 1965, principally be-
cause the increased number of countries party to the GATT has
made utilizing the amendment procedures very difficult.' 2 4 As a re-
sult, agreements and understandings which supplement or act as in-
terpretations of specific GATT provisions have been utilized. This
method was used, for example, for the various agreements reached
during the Tokyo Round of Negotiation. 125 The agreements from
the Tokyo Round are usually viewed as creating separate treaty obli-
gations, while their precise legal effect is unclear. ' 2 6 During the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations, there has been little direct discussion of
trade and environment issues that could result in significant amend-
ments, supplemental agreements, or re-interpretations respecting
trade and environment. 27
Of more direct interest is the waiver provision (Article XXV(5))
under which the Contracting Parties to the GATT, through a two-
thirds majority vote, can waive the application of particular obliga-
tions. 128 The waiver has been used to deal with individual country
121 See supra section III.A.
122 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1622-23.
123 Id.
124 The amendment procedures are found in GAIT Article XXX. See McGOVERN,
supra note 83, at 11-12; JAcKSON, supra note 33, at 73-82.
125 The agreements and understandings from the Tokyo Round are set out in Geneva
Protocol to the Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. U14875, 26 GATT BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 3 (1980), and Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva Pro-
tocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GAIT Doc. 114812, 26 GATT BASIC
INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 5 (1980).
126 See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 56-57. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text
(concerning international treaty law issues raised by the Tokyo Round Treaties).
The Contracting Parties to GATT, acting pursuant to Article XXV(I), can also take
action having the effect of supplementing the GATT obligations. This provision has been
little used in an explicit manner and, therefore, its extent is unclear. See McGOVERN, supra
note 83, at 29-30.
127 See GATT, the Uruguay Round and the environment, 85 Focus: GATT NEWSL., Oct.
1991, at 3-5 (briefly reviewing the environmental issues that have been discussed at the
Uruguay Round).
128 For a discussion of the the operation of Article XXV(5), see McGOVERN, supra note
83, at 30-31;JACKSON, supra note 20, at 43. Article XXV(5) states (in part):
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement,
the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a
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exemptions rather than with broad subject matter exceptions.' 29
The U.S. - Mexico GA TT Panel explicitly pointed out that this provision
might be used to overcome conservation and trade conflicts.' 30 It
should be noted, however, that during the Uruguay Round of negoti-
ations there has been a developing consensus that tighter conditions
should be applied to the granting of waivers under Article
XXV(5). l3 l
Without official GATT sanction, two product sectors, agricul-
ture and textiles, are essentially beyond the discipline of GATT
rules.' 3 2 There is no simple explanation for this state of affairs ex-
cept that countries including the United States and the countries of
the European Community have found the GATT rules respecting
these sectors unsatisfactory. 833 Environmental protection could sim-
ilarly be viewed to be beyond the discipline of GAT rules. Admit-
tedly, what is possible for a particular product sector may not be
possible for environmental protection potentially affecting goods
across all sectors. In addition, the exceptions to the GAT for agri-
culture and textiles have been much criticized as undermining the
GATT, and the Uruguay Round attempted to bring GATT discipline
to these sectors.' 3 4
contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority
shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 8, art. XXV, 5, 61 Stat. at A68-A69, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272, 274..
129 McGOVERN, supra note 83, at 31.
iS0 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1623.
131 GATT ACTIVITIES 1990, supra note 83, at 38-39. Moreover, a recent GATT panel
report noted that a waiver under Article XXV(5) was only to be granted in "exceptional
circumstances" and had to be interpreted narrowly since the waiver affected GATT obliga-
tions. United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar- Containing Products Ap-
plied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, GATT
Doc. LU6631, 37 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 228, 256-57
(1991).
132 JACKSON, supra note 20, at 44-45. See also McGOVERN, supra note 83, at 447-52
(concerning GAIT and agriculture). It is not accurate to say that the GAIT does not
apply to agricultural products. In recent years, a high percentage of trade disputes
brought before the GATT have involved agricultural and food products. See Ingrid Nor-
dgren, The GA TT Panels During the Uruguay Round: A Joker in the Negotiating Game, J. WORLD
TRADE L., Aug. 1991, at 57. However, GATT discipline on agriculture is not very strong.
Respecting textiles, side agreements to avoid the GATT eventually led to the Multilateral
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001,
930 U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter Multi-fiber Arrangement or MFA]. The effect of this ar-
rangement is to create a separate regime for the trade in textiles for those countries party
to the MFA. See McGOVERN supra note 83, at 507-14.
133 This is particularly true respecting agriculture. See McGOVERN, supra note 83, at
452-59.
134 Concerning agriculture, see Dale E. Hathaway, Agriculture in COMPLETING THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, at 51-61; Bernard M. Hoekman, Agriculture and the Uruguay Round, J. WORLD
TRADE L., Feb. 1989, at 83; GATT ACTIVITIES 1990, supra note 84, at 33-36. Agricultural
issues, particularly export subsidies, are the make-or-break issues at the Uruguay Round.
Concerning textiles, see William R.Cline, Textiles and Apparel in COMPLETING THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, supra note 84, at 63-78; Xiaobing Tang, Textiles and the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1989, at 51; GAIT ACTIVITIES 1990, supra
[VOL. 17
GATT PANEL REPORT
The GATT is not an inflexible set of rules. Formal and informal
means exist to suspend and alter the rules if a situation is accepted as
warranting such treatment. However, to reconsider the application
of GATT rules, the acceptance must be widespread and not confined
to select countries with political aims and/or overtly protectionist
goals in mind. While there is international acceptance of environ-
mental and conservation goals, there is little global consensus that
one nation or a group of countries can dictate how those goals are to
be achieved and in the process undermine the GAFT.
2. International Agreement to Modify GA TT
It is unlikely that one can expect much change from within
GAFF since the purpose of the Uruguay Round is to extend and
tighten GAT discipline. Undoubtedly, with this in mind, the U.S.-
Mexico GATT Panel recognized that the GAT could be modified
through international agreement.13 5 This recognition of the poten-
tial for other international arrangements to influence the obligations
under the GATT marks a change from the dismissive view adopted
by a 1987 GATT Panel regarding the possible importance of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.' 3 6 The
Panel, however, did not articulate the nature of the international
agreement necessary to modify the GATT.
An international treaty which explicitly states that it is modifying
the GATF obligations would do so for those countries party to the
newer treaty. International law requires, however, that the old treaty
not prohibit such a modification, that the new agreement not relate
to an obligation fundamental to the objects and purposes of the old
treaty, and that the new agreement not affect parties to the old treaty
who decide not to become parties to the new treaty.13 7 The latter
point is consistent with international treaty law, which directs that
where one country is a party to an old and a new treaty, and another
country is party to the old treaty, the treaty binding between the two
countries is the one to which both are parties irrespective of the new
treaty.' 38 The situation of explicit modification of the GATT by a
subsequent treaty occurs in the relationship between the GAT and
note 84, at 32-33. For many developing countries, textiles is the crucial issue at the Uru-
guay Round.
135 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1623.
136 Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, supra note 63, at
115. See Ted L. McDorman, International Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law: The
Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1990, at 107.
137 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
41, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 342. This article relates to subsequent agreements to modify a
multilateral agreement and operates where it is clearly the intent of the parties to modify
the earlier treaty since notice of the modification is to be given. Id.
138 id. art. 30, 4(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 338. See PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TREATIES 101-03 (1989).
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the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA),' 3 9 with the latter only applica-
ble to countries that are parties to it, and the GAIT applying to non-
MFA states.' 40 Within the operation of the above, there is consider-
able scope for conservation and environmental agreements to mod-
ify the GATT where the modification is explicitly stated in the new
treaty. The principal caveat is that the modification only applies to
those states party to the conservation and environmental agreement.
In some situations, however, conservation and environmental
agreements can modify the GATT without an explicit modification
statement and, more importantly, can modify the GATT even with
respect to non-parties to the conservation and environment agree-
ment. This can be seen through an examination of the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES).'41 Each party to CITES has an obligation to control
imports from parties and non-parties in the exact same manner. 142
An import embargo is prima facie inconsistent with Article XI(1) of
the GATT143 and since the resource being protected is outside the
importing country, exceptions under Article XX would not apply.144
Despite the silence in CITES of its relationship with the GATT, the
import restriction requirement is unmistakenly inconsistent with the
GAIT, and the clarity of the inconsistency indicates the intent to
modify the GATIT.1 45
The situation is more complicated, however, where two coun-
tries are party to the GATT and only one of them is party to CITES.
Technical international treaty law directs that as between the two
countries, the GAT would take precedence over CITES obliga-
tions. 1 4 6 However, technical international treaty law must yield to
the will of states. As one leading treaty expert stated, where a new
treaty is clearly and deliberately inconsistent with an old treaty" it is
more than likely that the political considerations will prevail over
139 Multi-fiber Arrangement, supra note 132, 25 U.S.T. at 1001, 930 U.N.T.S. at 166.
140 See McGOVERN, supra note 83, at 514-15.
141 CITES, supra note 1, 87 Stat. at 884, 993 U.N.T.S. at 243.
142 Article 111(3) of CITES puts strict controls on the import of any specimen of spe-
cies listed as endangered, irrespective of source. Id. art. III, 3, 27 U.S.T. at 1095-96. See
LYSTER, supra note 1, at 248. There are also export controls on endangered species but
this may not create a problem under GATT since the export restriction might fit within
exception Article XX(g) or (b).
143 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
144 See supra sections III.A.2 and III.A.3.
145 Although Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
notification of the intended modification, this formalistic consideration cannot undermine
the principle that where the intent to modify is clear the subsequent treaty modifies the
previous obligation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 137, art. 41,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 342. For a discussion of the revision (or modification) of treaties on a de
facto basis, see GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 136-37 (6th ed. 1976).
146 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 137, art. 30, 4(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339.
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legal niceties, for a deliberate violation . . . will be a sign that the
political basis for the earlier treaty no longer exists or that its ele-
ments have undergone fundamental change."' 47 With respect to
CITES, it can be argued that it is the will of states that respecting
trade in endangered species, GATT obligations must be modified
even for countries not a party to CITES.' 48 This proposition is en-
hanced when it is realized that there is overwhelming international
support for CITES, as indicated by the fact that more states are party
to CITES than to the GATT. 149 It can also be argued that given the
specificity of CITES, as compared to the generality of the GAT,
that the latter treaty has been superseded by CITES with regard to
endangered species. 150 The completeness of the CITES regime, its
obvious inconsistency with GATT, and the narrowness of the excep-
tion to GATT being created, also enhance the proposition that
CITES modifies the GATT. One can also add that conservation of
endangered species is of global concern and can only be effectively
dealt with by global action such as CITES. Approaching the ques-
tion from a different angle, it can be suggested that the GATT must
be interpreted in light of subsequent treaties and state practices' 5 '
which support the view that CITES exists as an exception to the
GATIT.
The ultimate test is whether a country views a potential conflict
between CITES and GATT as a conservation or trade issue. A coun-
try cannot be forced to submit to GAIT dispute settlement.' 5 2
Hence, if a dispute is not truly considered a trade matter, then the
GATT cannot be forced into operation. It is unthinkable that meas-
147 SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 95 (1985).
148 It might even be possible to argue CITES is part of customary international law,
which would take precedence over a treaty like GATT, because the customary law would
be more recent than the treaty law. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND TREATIES 34-36 (1985).
149 According to TREATIES IN FORCE 295 (1990), 106 states were party to CITES.
Only 101 entities were GATT members. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. This
degree of support issue is a crucial one since the GATT (or any multilateral treaty) cannot
be determined by a bilateral agreement which would allow a state to impose GATT- incon-
sistent measures against all other states. A country cannot easily contract out of its multi-
lateral treaty obligations.
150 See C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L.
401, 446-47 (1953).
151 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 137, art. 31, 3, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 340. Use of subsequent treaties and state practice to interpret a treaty is only
to be employed as a factor to be considered in interpreting the unclear wording of a treaty.
See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 135-38 (1984).
However, this formalistic constraint does not undermine the principle that subsequent
treaties and state practice are important in interpreting a treaty. See SCHWARZENBERGER &
BROWN, supra note 145, at 136-37; Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (U.S. v.
France), 38 INT'L L. REP. 182, 248-55 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1964) (French practice follow-
ing the conclusion of a bilateral treaty was determined to amount to a modification of the
treaty).
152 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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ures consistent with CITES would be perceived by GATT members
as being subject to GATT discipline such that GAIT dispute settle-
ment would be employed.' 53
Is it only through an international environmental or conserva-
tion treaty that the GATT can be modified? Given the flexibility
within the GATT itself to tolerate exceptions, it would be inconsis-
tent to take the view that only international treaty obligations can
modify the GATT. The better view posits that any expression of
broad international support for the modification of the GATT by en-
vironmental or conservation considerations would suffice to suspend
the operation of the GATT rules. An example would be a consensus
reached at the UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) expressed through the proposed statement of princi-
ples.154 It is unlikely that these principles will by themselves create
international legal obligations, but it would be difficult to deny them
any force or importance.155 To modify GATT obligations, a princi-
ple emerging from UNCED would have to be explicit and clearly be
intended to operate as a modification of the GAIT. The require-
ments of intent and clarity are not unreasonable given that a treaty
obligation would be superceded by something less than a treaty.
To ensure that a treaty like CITES or any consensus that
emerges at UNCED modifies GATT obligations, a waiver under
153 Application of the analysis developed in the above paragraphs to the trade meas-
ures employed against non- parties pursuant to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into forceJan. 1, 1989),
and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657, would probably lead to the
same conclusion. A different conclusion would be reached regarding the conflict between
the GATT and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). See generally McDorman, supra note 136, at 107.
154 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
155 Until the principles are finalized, it is unclear what their legal status will be. The
Brundtland Report recommended the consolidation of legal principles into a charter to
guide state behavior and submitted a set of proposed legal principles to be included in
such a document. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COM-
MON FUTURE 332-33, 348-51 (1987). It is most likely that the legal position will be similar
to that of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 110, which is not on its own consid-
ered a source of legal obligation although some of the principles have greatly influenced
the development of international environmental law. Alexandre Kiss, The International Pro-
tection of the Environment, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1074 (R.
St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.Johnston eds., 1983). One authority has commented about
the Stockholm Declaration:
Taking the document as a whole, one is nevertheless surprised that despite
the generality of some provisions and their uncertain phrasing the general
tone is one of a strong sense of dedication to the idea of trying to establish
the basic rules of international environmental law.
Sohn, supra note 110, at 513. Concerning the legal effect of declarations and U.N. resolu-
tions, see Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society,
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 787-95 (R. St. J. Macdonald &
Douglas Johnston eds., 1983). Respecting differing approaches to international environ-
mental law more generally, see ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLU-
TION, 31-61 (1983).
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GATT Article XXV(5) should be obtained. Without this, however,
the GATT can be said to be superseded where there exists a clearly
identifiable will of states to modify the GATT. The GATT is flexible
enough to accommodate exceptions and understandings even where
a doctrinal legal approach leads to a contrary result. 156
The difficulty with environmental treaties or other international
agreements that might modify the GATT lies in concluding the trea-
ties or procuring the necessary international agreement. Environ-
mental and conservation advocates need to focus on the achievement
of international consensus rather than on the failure of unilateralism
because of currently overridding GAIT obligations for which inter-
national agreement does exist.
VI. Conclusion
A dispute settlement panel established under the GATT had to
determine the consistency with international trade law of U.S legisla-
tion which prohibited the import of tuna because the manner in
which the tuna was harvested did not meet U.S. standards regarding
the incidental taking of dolphin. The U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel con-
cluded that the U.S. law was inconsistent with GATT primarily be-
cause the product being embargoed (tuna) was environmentally
friendly, and that GATT only deals with trade in goods and does not
look behind the product to examine if the production or manufactur-
ing process was environmentally friendly. The Panel took the view
that any other conclusion would result in the undermining of GATT
by allowing countries to employ embargoes against any country not
having the identical laws and standards as the importing country.
The conclusions of the Panel are correct as they relate to the focus of
GATT law upon goods and are important in that they clearly indicate
that unilateralism is impermissible.
Regarding the conflict between trade and environment, the re-
port of the GATT Panel does not signal that in all conflicts trade con-
siderations will outweigh environmental considerations. While the
GATT Panel determined that a country cannot utilize trade embar-
goes to impose its environmental standards on another country or
use import embargoes against products from a country with different
environmental laws, the GATT Panel did suggest that even in such a
situation it would be possible to use trade measures provided there
existed an international agreement which could be said to modify
GATT obligations.
The ultimate message of the GATT Panel report, therefore, is
156 A GATT dispute settlement panel may lack this sophistication since it will be con-
strained by the GATT wording. However, the doctrinal legal approach will be superseded
by political realities and a GATT panel would not be used. See supra notes 152-53 and
accompanying text.
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not a negative one; rather, it is a positive one. The manner in which
to promote environmental and conservation measures that may con-
flict with trade law is not to decry GATT or to advocate the imposi-
tion of unilateral measures, but to obtain international agreement
that environmental and conservation measures are to modify GATT.
As a technical matter, the findings of GATT panels only become
binding on parties once they are adopted by the GATT Council.' 5 7
Hence, the recommendation of the Panel that the United States alter
the MMPA to bring it into conformity with the GAT'158 remains
only a recommendation until the GATT Council adopts the report of
the Panel. Panel reports once brought to the GATT Council are in-
variably adopted without change.' 5 9
Reaction to the GATT Panel's report in the United States has
not been favourable.' 60 One group of Congress members wrote the
President protesting the GATT report. 16 1 Their press release
stated: "This inhumane ruling would run roughshod not only over
these hard-fought dolphin protection measures, but over our funda-
mental right to engage in worldwide conservation efforts."' 162
Mexico has agreed not to pursue adoption of the Panel report at
the GATT Council.' 63 The Mexican concern is the igniting of an
adverse environmental campaign centered on dolphin during a time
when a Canada-U.S.-Mexico North America Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) is being negotiated. 164 Moreover, the Mexican President
has announced the intention to put in place stricter controls on tuna
purse seining to reduce the incidental taking of dolphin.' 65 Hence,
the U.S. -Mexico GA TT Panel report will probably never become bind-
ing upon the United States.
157 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (referring to GATT dispute settlement
procedures).
158 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel, supra note 3, at 1623.
159 It is not uncommon, however, for there to be a considerable delay between the
time a panel report is brought before the GATT Council and its adoption. This occurs
because reports must be adopted by consensus which includes the losing party. See Da-
vey, supra note 20, at 85; JACKSON, supra note 20, at 96-97, 99.
160 See GA"T.. Environmental Group Says GATT Tuna Report Could Have Disastrous Conserva-
tion Impact, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36 at 1325 (1991).
161 Trade Policy: Members of Congress Protest Recent GA TT Ruling on U.S. Embargo of Mexican
Tuna, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at 1399 (1991).
162 Id. (emphasis added).
163 GA TT: Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 37 at 1351 (Sept. 18, 1991); Divine porpoise, supra note 91, at 31.
164 See GATT: Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna Embargoes, supra
note 163, at 135 1; Divine porpoise, supra note 91, at 3 1. Mexico's alleged lower environmen-
tal standards have been a major concern for various groups seeking to either block or
influence the NAFTA negotiations. See Election-Year Politics in U.S. Likely to Complicate Trade
Issues This Year, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2 at 77 (Jan. 8, 1992).
165 Mexico: Bowing to U.S. Pressure, Mexico to Have Observers on Tuna Boats, Delays GATT
Action, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at 1411 (Sept. 25,1991); Divine porpoise, supra note
91, at 31.
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